uncertainty of some geoengineering activities, effectiveness and reliability may be more difficult to secure than legitimacy, and so, as far as regulation is concerned, the focus should be upon securing a legitimate process. My paper seeks to address how this effective, reliable and legitimate regulation can be achieved given the prevailing constitutional framework of the EU. In particular, European regulation of one type of geoengineering research -Solar Radiation Management (SRM) field research -could be designed to maximise the possibility of securing legitimacy.
Geoengineering has been described as "large-scale intervention in the earth's climate system in order to moderate global warming" 2 and can be disaggregated into at least two broad groups of activities: 3 those that remove or reliably sequester carbon, 4 known as Carbon Dioxide Removal (CDR); and those that reflect sunlight to cool the earth, 5 known as Solar Radiation Management (SRM).
As field research that takes place outdoors beyond the confines of the lab or the computational model, SRM presents huge regulatory challenges both technical and normative. This paper considers how, principally, the latter of two areas of regulatory scholarship -EU regulation of risk and science, and transnational private regulation (TPR) -may contribute to a solution. As "the new body of rules, practices, and processes, created primarily by private actors, firms, NGOs, independent experts like technical standard setters and epistemic communities, either exercising autonomous regulatory power or implementing delegated powers", 6 TPR scholarship offers some 2 potentially useful insights which may also address the reluctance of states to be involved. 7 Assessing attempts at creating legitimate regulatory frameworks this paper conceives of legitimacy in terms of the 'legality' of 'transnational' regulation, and briefly draws on Weber's 'ideal type' of value-rational action as the basis of consent to the exercise of legal authority. 8 However, legitimacy can also be conceived in functional and procedural terms as the conditions by which normative expectations can be met.
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Considering four such conditions -responsiveness, flexibility, deliberation and inclusion -this paper argues that legitimacy is maximised when regulatory frameworks are both legal and responsive, flexible, deliberative and inclusive.
The task of demonstrating how a European regulatory framework for SRM field research maximises the possibility of securing legitimacy, by drawing on areas of transnational private regulatory scholarship and EU regulation of science and risk, is challenging, largely on account of the lack of empirical data. In this paper I suggest that notwithstanding the germinal state of SRM field research, an embryonic regulatory framework is discernible which can be characterised as nascent transnational private regulation (nTPR) and assumes that, in the EU context, the direction of travel will be from nTPR to more full-blooded EU regulation.
My claim is that where there is significant scientific uncertainty 'incorporated' risk assessments, as opposed to 'isolated' ones, should be used in the EU's regulatory frameworks for SRM field research so that legitimacy can be maximised. An incorporated risk assessment involves science and politics simultaneously and contrasts with the isolated approach -one adopted in the technocratic paradigm -which engages science only in the assessment of risk; politics is consigned to the management of that risk. By adopting an incorporated approach to risk, the EU can maximise legitimacy in three ways: legitimacy as legality, supplementing the conditions for deliberative and inclusive participation in decision-making processes and by transforming a rigid regulatory framework into a flexible and responsive one. This is a novel claim in that it advocates a regulatory mechanism -the incorporated risk assessment -which provides a space for inclusion and deliberation within a technocratic regulatory framework.
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Three substantive sections of the paper set out more fully the problem posed for legitimacy by SRM field research, the difficulties of the EU's orthodox response to that problem, and finally my alternative response based on the incorporated approach to risk assessment. Section II, A Challenge for Legitimacy, defines SRM 'laboratory' and 'field' research and goes on to suggest that there may be instances when the effects have significant scientific uncertainty. Significant scientific uncertainty is defined and the tension between politics and science introduced. The section suggests that the nascent regulation of SRM research, when viewed as transnational private regulation is suffering a legitimacy deficit because the regulating institutions have no formal legal authority to act. Two significant issues arise: the relationship between politics and science in the regulating procedures and institutions, and the ability of individuals to participate directly or be represented in them.
Section III on the EU's response to the challenge for legitimacy argues that the EU's regulation of SRM research is likely to address the challenge for legitimacy in terms of establishing a firm legal basis to regulate. However, the EU's response is problematic, because as identified in section II above, it fixes the relationship between politics and science so that there is no flexibility and it makes it difficult for individuals to participate directly in any meaningful way in regulatory institutions. It classifies the EU's response as typically technocratic. 10 The technocratic/deliberative distinction of regulatory paradigms is found in other work, such as the In section IV I offer an alternative response, one that maximises the possibility of securing legitimacy. It seeks to make a small yet significant adjustment to legitimacy as conceptualised in formal legal terms by reconfiguring risk-assessments to incorporate elements of a more deliberative, responsive and flexible approach. This mechanism is taken from a conceptualisation of legitimacy associated with directly deliberative polyarchy. In this way the alternative response aims to combine the best of both worlds and maximise the possibility of securing legitimacy.
II. A challenge for Legitimacy
The effects of SRM field research can be been grouped into those that are physicalclimatic and environmental -11 and those that are socio-political 12 or non-physical.
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In this paper significant scientific uncertainty relates to the physical effects of SRM research; which is not to say that non-physical effects are not significant or do not pose difficulties for legitimacy or do not have implications for SRM governance. 14 I turn to the relationship between physical and non-physical risks in due course.
Significant scientific uncertainty
Uncertainty is a way of describing the limits of our understanding of a subject. physical effects of specific research projects as well as those of the broader SRM research endeavour. 17 All else being equal, as the subject matter becomes more complex, the less likely we are to know this about it. As the limits of our understanding increase so does uncertainty.
It is for scientists to understand the limits of their understanding. In quantifying those limits they make claims about scientific uncertainty. It is scientists, then, that are best placed to determine whether scientific uncertainty is significant or not. 18 An example of when uncertainty is significant is when it is unable to be quantified. The two columns relate to transboundary characteristics and the two rows to the regulatory frameworks. For both rows there are transboundary and non-transboundary effects which are either significantly scientifically uncertain or not. The shaded areas are characteristics which pose particularly thorny issues for the regulatory frameworks.
For both transnational and EU regulatory frameworks, SRM field research effects that are significantly scientifically uncertain pose difficulties. This is important. Both EU and transnational regulatory frameworks are deficient in addressing the issue of legitimacy of SRM field research activities where the effects are significantly scientifically uncertain. The reason for this deficiency stems from the relationship between uncertainty and risk. Whilst uncertainty is a key feature of risk, significant scientific uncertainty means that risk assessments are undermined because scientific information is not concrete or certain enough to provide a reliable assessment. The inability of science to assess risk has implications for the broader analysis of risk which takes into account political and other factors only in the risk management phase. It is for this reason that Majone identifies "arguably the most important question facing political leaders, citizens, and experts is how to limit regulatory discretion and enforce accountability in policy areas characterised by high uncertainty and cognitive complexity and that are also politically very sensitive?" 58 I return to this point in part III. 58 Majone, "Foundations of Risk Regulation", supra note 37, p. 6
The EU is able to rely on orthodox constitutional principles developed in caselaw to safeguard legitimacy for regulating activities that are not significantly scientifically 93 and codes of practice. 94 The development of governance principles and implementing standards by non-state actors is significant because it demonstrates a nascent form of autonomous regulatory power which characterises further TPR.
c. The legitimacy deficit Autonomous regulatory power poses problems for legitimacy as conceptualised by transnational regulatory theory. On the whole, and according to general constitutional principles, national-centred regulation relies on forms of democratic legitimacy for justification. 95 However, as regulation is removed from the state, whether that is in terms of a movement from national to transnational setting or in terms of a movement from public to private actors, the constitutional lines of democratic legitimacy become weaker. 96 A concept of legitimacy that hinges on the legality of the democratic mandate in positive Weberian terms is bound to be reduced in transnational or private regulatory regimes; 'such regimes will necessarily lack legitimacy and any potential for legitimacy, in legal terms'. 97 For this reason, Majone attributes to the regulatory state 98 the problem of securing and maintaining legitimacy as it transfers regulatory functions from state to non-state institutions. This is something to which we return later.
But legitimacy becomes particularly problematic when regulation moves away from the state because the orthodox mechanisms of democratic legitimacy are weakened.
Transnational regulation "may end up in a democratic cul-de-sac". 99 Issues of legitimacy are particularly salient for transnational private regulation of public goods, 100 which the Oxford Principles claim SRM research is.
In 
III. The EU's response to the challenge of legitimacy
There are a number of reasons why the EU would regulate SRM field research: to provide a high level of protection of the environment, 102 public health 103 or to ensure the proper functioning of the internal market 104 -were one to emerge -through the approximation of laws. In Table 1 Non-experimental releases into the environment and the internal market are covered under part C of the Deliberate Release Directive.
Both relevant directives -the Deliberate Release Directive and the Contained Use
Directive -demonstrate some of the complexity associated with implementation.
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For example, the Contained Use Directive effectively allows member states to implement national rules as it chooses whereas part C of the Deliberate Release Directive, relating to the marketing of biotech crops, is implemented at the EU level with member states given very little discretion as to how to make or apply those rules. Applying this analysis to the regulation of SRM field research we might expect to see the EU develop a regulatory framework for the process of SRM, that is, the general scientific endeavour, which is able to assess research projects on a case-by-case basis.
The regulatory framework could grant regulatory control to member states for contained or laboratory research as well as for non-transboundary field research.
However, the EU is likely to reserve for itself control over transboundary research, possibly creating a new European independent scientific advisory committee or by using an existing one. Whilst the impact on the market is not yet significant for SRM, that is not to say that it may not exist in the future or that other products become significant for the research, such as materials to be used for SRM technology research.
Assuming that the EU regulates SRM research, the issues posed by significant scientific uncertainty identified in part II will continue. In the following section I explain how the EU might respond to the legitimacy of decision-making where science is unable to adequately assess risk.
Attempting to safeguard legitimacy
The EU's orthodox response to the question of legitimacy lies with the landmark case of Meroni. 125 The case involved a decision by the European Coal and Steel Community's High Authority to require two agencies, known as the Brussels Agencies, to administer a new scrap metal equalisation scheme. Meroni was a steel company subject to the scheme and required to contribute to the fund by the High Authority.
Meroni successfully sought an annulment of the High Authority's decision on the basis, in part, on the misuse of powers. The court enunciated four principles regarding delegation of powers. Firstly, the powers delegated must not be more extensive that the power of the delegator. Secondly, a delegation must be express not implied.
Thirdly, only permissible powers can be delegated: only those powers that are 'clearly defined executive powers' rather than discretionary powers can be delegated; the consequences of the delegated power must necessarily be the same as the exercise of delegating power. Lastly, the delegation must not disturb the Community's 'balance of powers'. 126 Meroni and subsequent case law has acted as a constitutional limit -the Meroni doctrine 127 -to the delegation of discretionary powers by Community institutions.
128
Regulatory agencies, including independent scientific authorities such as the European scientific uncertainty. Drawing on the concept of legitimacy set out in Meroni would serve to address the legitimacy deficit for nTPR in some respects but not others; that is, for transboundary effects but not under conditions of significant scientific uncertainty.
The outer shaded areas identifying the legitimacy deficit for non-significant scientific uncertainty would be ameliorated. However, for SRM field research that is significantly scientific uncertain, legitimacy conceptualised as 'legality', would continue. What connects nTPR and EU regulation is that these difficulties remain also for SRM field research regulated by the EU. This should involve a collection of all the information available and an assessment of that information by experts".
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Secondly, the institutional separation of science from politics necessarily leads to a regulatory principle underpinning risk analysis which I call 'isolated' risk assessments.
The role of science in assessments of risk is isolated so that risk is to be ascertained by scientific expertise alone. The institutional arrangements -the 'administrative constitution' -do not allow there to be any other information upon which risk is assessed (only 'managed'). Figure 1 
below depicts the relationship between the
Meroni doctrine, the institutional separation and the lock into isolated risk assessments. The regulatory 'lock' into isolated assessments marks a return to a point foreshadowed in the introduction, namely that the EU's regulatory structure for risky activities tends to be rigid and technocratic. The principle of isolated risk assessments is rigid because it is unable to apply different types of risk assessment such as the incorporated risk assessment. It prevents the regulatory framework from responding appropriately to differing levels of scientific uncertainty posed by different activities. It is unable to respond to the high level of scientific uncertainty characterising trans-scientific issues 136 such as significant scientific uncertain SRM field research. In short the EU's response as articulated in the Meroni doctrine is counterproductive in maximising legitimacy because of the assumption it makes about the ability of science to assess the risk of SRM and its research. So the legitimacy deficit of nTPR might be ameliorated through the EU's formalisation and commitment to Meroni's principle of non- 135 Majone, "Foundations of Risk Regulation", supra note 37, at p. 18. 136 Ibid.
Constitutional development of non-delegation on the basis of balance of powers
Scientific and political institutions are separated 'Locked' into isolated risk assessments delegation but the resulting framework might also be unresponsive, inflexible, exclusive and technocratic.
IV. An alternative approach
This is the story so far: SRM field research is a trans-scientific issue when its effects are significantly scientifically uncertain thereby raising challenges about legitimate decision-making. Conceptualising the nascent regulation of SRM research as nTPR allows us to view those legitimacy challenges in terms of the legality of decisionmaking institutions and processes. The EU's response to the challenge of legitimacy is focused on the legal constitutional principle of non-delegation, thereby safeguarding the EU's institutional balance of powers. In so doing the EU safeguards legitimacy as conceptualised by the transnational approach but results in inflexible, unresponsive, exclusive and technocratic frameworks. To ameliorate these problems, also associated with legitimacy, we can turn to an alternative conceptualisation of regulation and concomitant views of legitimacy.
There are three parts to this final section in which I set out an alternative response to regulating SRM research that is better able to maximise the possibility of securing legitimacy. Firstly, I illustrate the conceptualisation of regulation as 'directly deliberative polyarchy' through the example of responsible research and innovation. I use this functional approach to identify other significant aspects of legitimacyresponsiveness, flexibility, deliberation and inclusion. Secondly, I suggest that an incorporated approach to risk assessment can safeguard elements of deliberation and inclusion within the existing EU regulatory approach. Finally, in looking at the implications of adopting the incorporated risk assessments, I suggest that the EU will be required to take the counter-intuitive response to safeguarding legitimacy by departing on occasion from its strict non-delegation position, but in so doing a more flexible, responsive framework can emerge that is better able to maximise the possibility of securing legitimacy.
Illustrating an alternative conceptualisation of regulation and legitimacy
What follows is an illustration of how the regulation of one type of SRM field experiment helps us think about alternative conceptualisations of legitimacy and the degree to which they are able to address the deficiencies presented by legitimacy as 'legality' under the conditions of significant scientific uncertainty.
a. SPICE -An example of 'responsible research and innovation'
The Stratospheric Particle Injection for Climate Engineering (SPICE) project 137 investigated the effectiveness of SRM by exploring how the mimicking of natural processes of volcanic eruptions by injecting sulphate particles into the stratosphere might lower average global temperatures. There were three working packages which aimed to evaluate candidate particles, test delivery systems and model climate impacts.
SPICE is an example of SRM field research because the second of its working packages aimed to investigate "the feasibility of putting particles into the stratosphere in order to affect global temperatures". 138 This part of the project was to take place outdoors in order to explore potential delivery systems of the particles into the stratosphere 139 by studying a large balloon tethered by a 25km length of pipe to a pump on the ground.
Unlike other proposed testswhose effects could be transboundary 140 Firstly, they allow for science and politics to be considered simultaneously during the risk assessment phase. To this extent, risk can be 'co-assessed' just as it is 'coproduced'. 165 Thus, rather than politics being consigned to representative interests in democratic institutions such as in the legislature through formal processes such as lawmaking, political involvement is able to take place in the administration of regulation at the point of assessment of risk. It is incoherent to use science as the basis for assessing risk where scientific uncertainty is high, and as a result something more is needed. By incorporating other bases for its assessment risk can be constructed in ways that reflect members' values rather than on incomplete scientific data.
Secondly, incorporated risk assessments are spaces in which individuals can participate directly should they choose. There are formal opportunities for individuals to participate in decision-making processes such as in the form of written comments on proposals as well as in attending meetings. Direct individual participation means that it may be possible for lay knowledge to be included in decision-making processes on the basis that the participation is deliberative. Participation does not dispense with expertise but includes all "generally reliable knowledge, subject to methodological and epistemological limits". 166 Risk is assessed through a process of deliberation with participation by lay persons and through interest group representatives.
It is arguable that deliberation and inclusion by different interest group representatives should take place in all risk assessments based on the politically contingent nature of science itself. This is accepted. But as I set out in the introduction, the intention of this paper is not to critique the orthodox epistemology of science nor to call for a wholesale shift from the technocratic to the deliberative paradigm. My approach is pragmatic instead: only where there is a significant degree of scientific uncertainty should incorporated approach to risk be facilitated. In so doing my aim is to minimise the disruption to the 'constitutional administration' of the regulation of SRM research. My suggestion is that where scientific uncertainty is significant there is an intertwining of the scientific, the social and the political, which evidences the need for a riskincorporated approach to risk assessment. It is the significance of scientific uncertainty that triggers the need for a risk-incorporated approach so that the scientific, the social and the political can intertwine.
As I suggested above, taking an incorporated approach to risk assessment makes it more inclusive and deliberative by providing opportunities for lay persons to be directly involved in assessments of significantly scientifically uncertain SRM field research.
There are other notable advantages for the EU: employing an incorporated approach to risk assessment will be to develop a regulatory framework in the EU that is more flexible and responsive, and therefore better able to maximise legitimacy. It is to these last characteristics that the paper now turns.
Implications for the EU
In section III this paper suggested that the EU's response to safeguarding legitimacy was based on the principle of non-delegation. The case of Meroni illustrated the EU's preservation of the institutional balance of powers, which in turn preserves the institutional separation of science and politics in the assessment and management of risk respectively. I suggested that the Meroni doctrine -this regulatory procedure -'locks' the EU's regulatory framework into one specific type of risk analysis. It is less able to respond to different types of activities because change can only take place pursuant to treaty revisions. In short the framework is rigid, not flexible and responsive.
As a result it is less able to maximise legitimacy as conceptualised by directly deliberative polyarchy because it cannot respond to members' normative expectations.
My suggestion is that a risk-incorporated approach is better able to maximise the possibility of securing legitimacy for a regulatory framework in the context of highly scientifically uncertain SRM field research by being more flexible, preventing regulatory lock-ins and facilitating participation in decision-making processes. By adopting a pragmatic stance, elements of directly deliberative polyarchy can be incorporated into the administrative constitutionalism of the EU.
However, as the EU stands, there is little possibility of creating the space for an incorporated approach to assessing risk because the principle of non-delegation set out in Meroni precludes the delegation of political powers to scientific institutions. The implications for the EU of developing a regulatory framework that maximises the possibility of securing legitimacy by being flexible is that it will be required to take the counter-intuitive step to delegate decision-making authority in certain circumstances to politically and scientifically composed regulatory bodies. Changing the approach set out in Meroni will prevent the lock-in of institutionally separating risk from politics and can allow institutions to evaluate risk by incorporating, rather than separating, politics and science.
The step is counter-intuitive precisely because that delegation will be seen to disturb the constitutional balance of powers that has ties to democratic legitimacy as its core.
Moreover, in the context of decision-making around scientifically uncertain activities, the Meroni doctrine safeguards against the lawful making of decisions by scientists on the grounds of efficiency.
It is arguable that these disturbances would reduce formal legal legitimacy. But the disturbance can be minimised in three ways. Firstly, the delegation can be controlled;
it can be subject to procedural safeguards such as those set out in the Administrative Lastly, strict conditions will be imposed on when the delegation can take place. In the context of SRM field research this will be when a threshold of scientific uncertainty is significant. The threshold for significant scientific uncertainty is noteworthy because it is the point at which a move from the isolated to incorporate risk assessment is triggered. Who decides this threshold? I suggest that it be agreed by political institutions on advice from scientists as a 'framework threshold' in much the same way as 'framework goals' such as 'good water status' comprise part of the EU's experimentalist architecture identified by Sable and Zeitlin. By contrast, the decision as to whether SRM field research actually falls within the threshold and therefore classifiable as significantly scientifically uncertain rests with scientists themselves. Again, this poses difficulties.
There may be problems such as whether scientists are likely to be biased and want to preserve for themselves their own autonomous space. There is also the charge that the decision to use the risk incorporated mechanism thereby triggering a delegation of decision-making power has simply replaced the scientific assessment of risk:the decision about risk has been shifted further up the line to question of whether the technology is scientifically uncertain or not.
These problems are valid but not insurmountable. The pragmatic stance accepts that decisions about scientific uncertainty need to be taken somewhere and by someone. 176 Article 28 of the 'shortselling' regulation 177 gives ESMA the power to adopt intervening measures to ban short-selling 'in exceptional circumstances' where there is a threat to the proper functioning of the financial markets. The Court rejected the UK's plea that the power entails 'a very large measure of discretion' 178 on the basis that they are amenable to judicial review 179 and therefore suitably circumscribed. 180 The judgment does not undermine the constitutional principle set out in Meroni and the necessity of the balance of powers. The ESMA case is situated in a different context to that of scientific uncertainty in this paper and adopts a different basis of legitimacy, arguably output legitimacy 181 but it does place greater weight on the conditions of delegation and the availability of judicial review, which arguably have changed since
Meroni. The overall point is that Meroni has not been applied strictly to preclude regulatory measures by ESMA and my suggestion that delegation take place subject to strict safeguards is not entirely unprecedented.
The pragmatic stance and incorporated risk assessment advanced in this paper balances the need of objective certainty from science (as opposed to decision made on politically arbitrary public opinion or other criteria) with the understanding that under certain conditions alternative constructions of risk should be recognised. My approach differs from Fisher's deliberative-constitutive paradigm in which a shift from one paradigm to another requires a substantial change to the administrative constitution. The pragmatic stance accepts that whilst there may be desirable elements of the deliberative paradigm, there need not take place a wholesale change in the administrative constitution away from the technocratic paradigm. The pragmatic stance minimises the disturbance of the EU's constitutional balance of powers, and as such may be considered an improvement on a regulatory framework located in the deliberative paradigm alone.
V Conclusion
Claims about the legitimate regulation of SRM field research are easy to make but difficulty to substantiate. Firstly, the current absence of a formal regulatory or legal framework for SRM field research makes it difficult to suggest improvements that strengthen its legitimacy. Secondly, the significant scientific uncertainty of SRM field research and its effects link to questions of risk and the relationship between science, politics and other value-systems. Thirdly, there is no certainty about what kind of regulatory framework will emerge, leading to similar uncertainty about the conceptions of legitimacy that will be relied upon. In trying to suggest mechanisms to maximise the possibility of securing legitimacy, this paper has engaged with many variables:
what sort of regulatory framework will emerge; how can risk be regulated; and what concept of legitimacy will be employed? It is within the context of these significant variables that the paper's central claim has been made.
The paper suggested how the EU regulation of SRM field research could be designed to maximise the possibility of securing legitimacy. Under conditions of significant scientific uncertainty, SRM field research poses challenges for its legitimate regulation.
The EU's orthodox response to the challenge to legitimacy is to ensure the institutional 'balance of powers'. This response is deficient because it entrenches a risk analysis approach that is inappropriate for significantly scientifically uncertain SRM technology. My suggestion is a pragmatic one. It is to institutionalise an incorporated approach to risk which provides space for deliberative and inclusive decision-making in the technocratic paradigm as part of a responsive and flexible framework whilst retaining the general institutional balance of the EU. In doing so, the EU develops spaces for more directly deliberative polyarchy without jettisoning its orthodox constitutional approach.
In the introduction I explained why the paper engages with two substantial areas of regulatory scholarship: EU regulation of risk and transnational private regulation. In exploring the relationships between conceptualisations of legitimacy and their respective regulatory frameworks, this paper is not situated firmly in the literature on transnational private regulation or in EU regulatory scholarship. Instead it spans both.
The aim has not been to contribute solely to one or other area of scholarship but to evaluate how each views legitimacy and then apply it in the context of the regulation of SRM field research. The paper is intended to be of interest to both audiences because it provides an opportunity to apply the concept of legitimacy beyond the terms ordinarily expected of each respective regulatory theory. In so doing the paper endeavours to provide a theoretical opening in which both audiences are able to think about how to govern SRM field research that best maximises the possibility of securing legitimacy.
